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Article 4

NOTES AND COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
REVIEWABLE ORDER
The Federal Communications Commission ordered that no license
would be granted to a broadcasting station having certain specified
Plaintiff network and another
kinds of contracts with networks.'
brought suit in a federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the
order. 2 The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 3 and
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, the regulation was a
reviewable "order", and that the review had been properly brought in
the district court. 4
1.

2.

F.C.C. Order of May 2, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941), as amended
by F.C.C. Order of October 11, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 5257-58. The
text of the regulations is reprinted at 316 U.S. 425, 62 S. Ct.
1204, 44 Fed. Supp. 693, and F.C.C. Regulation of Competition
Among Radio Networks (1942) 51 Yale L. J. 452, note 32. Briefly
stated, the order provides that no license will be granted to a
broadcasting station having contracts with a network which contracts: exclude broadcasts of other networks' programs; restrict
other stations in the same area from broadcasting the network's
programs not taken by the first station; are for a period of more
than two years; give an option time of less than 56 days for the
selection of network programs; prohibit a station from rejecting
any network programs it chooses; and other minor contract provisions.
Suit was brought in the district court under the authority of the
Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. §402 (a)
(1941), which extends the application of the Urgent Deficiencies
Act, 38 Stat. 220 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. §§47 47 (a) (1941) to "suits
to . . . enjoin . . . any order of the [Federal Communications]
or refusing
any order . . . granting
Commission except
an application . . . for a radio station license, or for modification of an existing station license . . ." The Urgent Deficiencies

3.

4.

Act incorporated into 47 U.S.C.A. §402 (a) provided for a review
in the district court with the right to appeal directly to the Supreme
Court.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 44 Fed. Supp. 688
(1942) (the companion case to the instant one). The ground
stated by L. Hand, J. at 692 was that the review should have been
brought under 47 U.S.C.A. §402 (b) instead of §402 (a). §402 (b)
provided that review of the commission's decisions should be taken
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
for all cases coming within the exceptions of §402 (a) noted supra,
note 2. Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Fed. Communications
Comm., 316 U.S. 4, 62 S. Ct. 875 (1942). Judge Hand also indicated at 692 his uncertainty as to whether the commission's regulations should be regarded as an "order" subject to review under
§402 (a) even if it were applicable.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States et al., 316
U.S. 407, 62 Sup. Ct. 1194, 86 L. Ed. 1066 (1942), Justices Frankfurter, Reed, and Douglas dissenting. Since the regulations themselves neither grant, deny, or modify any license, any review before an application for a license has been acted upon is not an
exception to §402 (a), and review must be brought according to the
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It seems certain that before judicial review of any administrative
regulations can be obtained, the regulations must amount to not only
an "order",5 but a "final order". 6 The fact that the commission called
the regulations an "order" is immaterial.7 The real test of whether
they partake of orders seems to be one of substance, with the stress
falling on whether or not the rights of individuals or the relationships
of individuals are affected.8
The regulations in question are of a dual nature. They affect
the contractual relationship between radio networks and stations, and
also limit the power of stations to secure a new license or a renewal of
specifications of that section pertaining to orders. The majority
opinion at 316 U.S. 407, 420, 421, 62 Sup. Ct. 1202 held the regulations in controversy constituted a definite "order" determining
the contract rights of plaintiff network. The district court in 44
Fed. Supp. 688, 692, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the instant case at 316 U.S. 431, 64 Sup. Ct. 1207, take
the contrary position, saying the regulations amounted only to a
declaration of the commission's policy regarding the issuance of
future licenses and hence was not a reviewable "order" within the
meaning of §402 (a). They cite in support of this position the
Minute of October 31, 1941 (reprinted at 316 U.S. 428 62 Sup. Ct.
1205 and 44 Fed. Supp. 694) passed by the commission the day
after suit was filed in the district court. In effect, the Minute
stated that any station could ". . . contest the validity of the
regulations . . . or the reasonableness of their application . .. [by
having its] license . . . set for hearing," and to insure that the

5.
6.

7.
8.

station might remain on the air, provision was made for the extension of the station's existing license until a final determination could
be reached. It was contended from this that the flexibility of the
regulations as to future licensing matters connoted more "policy"
than "order".
47 U.S.C.A. §402 (a).
United States v. Los Angeles R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927)(Where
an order evaluating the property of a railroad by the Interstate
Commerce Commission was held to be merely a statement of the
result of an investigation and not a reviewable "final order");
United States v. Ill. Central R.R., 244 U.S. 82 (1917) (where an
I.C.C. "order" assigning a cause for action was held not to be a
reviewable order); cf. where interlocutory orders were held nonreviewable: See. & Exchange Comm. v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d)
441 (1937); Philadelphia C.P.Ry. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm. of
Pa. 271 Pa. 39, 114 Atl. 642 (1921); Utah Consol. Mining Co. v.
Industrial Comm. of Utah, 66 Utah 173, 240 Pac. 440 (1925).
Contra: State v. N.H. Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N. H. 218, 156 Atl. 816
(1931).
A.F. of L. v. N.L.R.B., 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Powell v. United States,
300 U.S. 276 (1937).
A.F. of L. v. N.L.R.B., 308 U.S. 401 (1940) "We must look rather
to the language of the statute, read in the light of its purpose
. . . to ascertain whether the 'order' for which review in court is
provided, is contrasted with forms of administrative action differently described as a purposeful means of excluding them from the
review provisions." Rochester Tel. Co. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125 (1939) (where an order determining status was held reviewable); Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 276 (1937) "Overemphasis
upon the mere form of the order may not be permitted to obscure
its purpose and effect." Cf. United States v. Los Angeles R.R.,
273 U.S. 299 (1927); United States v. Ill. Central R.R., 244 U.S.
82 (1917).
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an old license. 9 However, it was contended by the commission that the
regulations only indirectly affected plaintiff's rights, and then only
on the contingency of future administrative action, and therefore
were not reviewable.10
It is true that prima facie the issuance of the regulations may
have had no immediate and direct effect upon plaintiff's substantive
rights. It was so worded that the apparent purpose was to modify
the requirements necessary for the issuance or renewal of station
licenses in the future, a fact with which none of the networks had
any connection. Even a cursory examination however, of these requirements reveals the repercussions resulting to plaintiff and other
networks."
Although in form the regulations may be prospective and not
addressed to plaintiff, in substance the networks' contractual relations with affiliated stations suffer a real and present jeopardy,
despite the fact that the sanctions of the regulations have not yet
2
been invoked.'
In view of the practical application of the regulations, while
they may have been declaratory of the commission's future licensing
policy, they also constituted an "order" in that they impaired plaintiff's contractual rights and business relations with station owners
whose licenses the regulations may cause to be revoked. The threat
of injury to plaintiff was already impending at the time the suit was
filed in the district court.1 3
It would not seem just to compel plaintiff network to forego the
advantages of a judicial review of an order said not to affect it
and require it to sit idly by while that same order was undermining
its commercial existence by prescribing the kinds of contracts others
9. Instant case at 417, 62 Sup. Ct. 1200.
10. Instant case at 420, 62 Sup. Ct. 1201 (citing cases). This argument found support in the district court, 44 Fed. Supp. 688, 692.
"The regulations are nothing more than a declaration-or if one
chooses, a threat-by the commission that it will impose those
conditions upon any renewal of a license in the future. No change
is made in the status of 'affiliates' meanwhile; their existing
contracts with the networks remain enforceable."
11. Instant case at 413, 62 Sup. Ct. 1198. Many of the stations under
contract with plaintiff had threatened to cancel their contracts
before the regulations became effective, and stations whose contracts had expired refused to enter into new ones for fear of
losing their licenses. This uncertainty of contractual relations
with affiliated stations also placed plaintiff's contracts with radio
advertisers in a precarious position. Advertisers refused to contract sponsored programs with plaintiff until they had some assurance of how many stations were to be affiliated with plaintiff.
12. Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 276 (1937) (repudiates the suggestion that merely because an order is not in terms addressed to
those whose rights are affected, they are precluded from review);
Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932);
Western Pac. C. R. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 284 U.S. 47 (1931).
13. Note 11, supra illustrates the undercurrent of contractual unrest
already caused by the regulations.
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could make with it under penalty of license revocation to the one
who dared disobey. 1 '

BILLS AND NOTES
PAYEE OF PROMISSORY NOTE AS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
Defendant executed a note payable to plaintiff or order and
delivered the note to A, a stock salesman, to hold on certain conditions.
A immediately discounted the note to plaintiff, without indorsement
and without defendant's knowledge or consent. Plaintiff, having no
notice of any defenses to the note, paid value therefor. Held, the
payee is a holder in due course of this note, and is free from the
defense of want of consideration. Wabash Valley Trust Co. v. Fisher,
Ind. , 41 N.E. (2d) 352 (1942).
The issue seems settled that under the common law a payee
could be a holder in due course, purely on grounds of negotiable instruments law, Armstrong v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 133 U.S.
433 (1889); Cage v. Lane, 49 Ark. 465, 5 S.W. 790 (1887), although
many cases frequently cited in support of this proposition are really
decided on grounds of estoppel. Lucas et al. v. Owens, 113 Ind. 521,
16 N.E. 196 (1888).
However, with the adoption of the UNIFORM NEGoTABz INsTRUMENTS LAW, (1895) UNFORM LAws ANN., Vol. 5; IND. STAT. ANN.
(Burns, 1933) §§19-101 to 19-1807 (hereinafter cited: N.I.L), a difference of judicial opinion early arose out of certain provisions, primarily §52(4) (A holder in due course must, among other things,
take the instrument by negotiation without notice of any infirmity in
the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it), and
§30 ("An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one
person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the
holder thereof. . . . If payable to order it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery").
One of these conflicting rules applies a strict and literal interpretation of the statute, whereby it is generally found that the payee is
not a holder in due course. Davis v. Nat. City Bank of Rome, 46 Ga.
App. 194; 167 S.E. 191 (1932); Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk et al.,
135 Iowa 350, 112 N.W. 807 (1907); Long v. Shafer et al., 185 Mo.
App. 641, 171 S.W. 690 (1914). The basis of this view rests in the
interpretation of the requirement of N.I.L. §52(4) that the holder
take the note by negotiation, which, in the case of an order instrument,
14.

Since the overruling of Proctor & Gamble v. United States, 225
U.S. 282 (1912), and the cases following it, the "negative order"'
doctrine seems to present no difficulty in the present case. Rochester Tel. Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939); accord,
United States v. Maher, 307 U.S. 148 (1939); Fed. Power Comm.
v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939). For a discussion
of the doctrine and the cases in support of and against this now
dead doctrine, see Note (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 379. In view
of the Rochester case, it is clear that the fact that the regulations
in the instant case did not in terms prohibit plaintiff from doing
certain acts seems immaterial. Once again the test seems to be
one of substance. See note 8, supra.

